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Abstract: In a period of market liberalization and multilateral trade negotiations, price 
discrimination for commodities with distinct markets provides additional policy options to 
support farm income. While both the USA and Canada have implemented price discrimination 
policies in their domestic dairy sector, so far the European Union (EU) has not. This paper 
evaluates the options of developing a price discrimination policy in the EU dairy sector. The 
analysis is based on an interregional model of the EU dairy sector, involving milk production, 
dairy processing, and consumption of ten dairy commodities in nine regions. The paper shows 
that a price discrimination policy that increases prices for commodities with more inelastic 
demand (fluid milk, soft dairy products) would generate income that can be redistributed to dairy 
farmers. The results suggest that, while such a price discrimination policy can be a WTO-
compatible way to support dairy farm income, the efficiency of the associated income transfers 
declines in the presence of significant supply response.  
 
Keywords: EU, price discrimination, pooling, dairy policy 
 
                                                 
1 Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache and Vincent Réquillart are with INRA Department of 
Economics, BP 27, 31326 Castanet Tolosan cedex (France). Jean-Paul Chavas and Thomas L. 
Cox are with the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin, 
Madison, WI 53706. 
Email address : requilla@toulouse.inra.fr   
1 
Price Discrimination and EU Dairy Policy: An Economic Evaluation of Policy Options 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, agricultural policy has been heavily influenced by multilateral trade 
negotiations. In particular, World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations have generated a 
significant move toward agricultural market liberalization. In agricultural policy, this has meant 
reductions in trade restrictions, import tariffs, and export subsidies. However, the European 
Union (EU) dairy sector remains heavily influenced by dairy policy which continues to support 
dairy farm income (e.g., Burrell, 1985, 1989, Hubbard, 1992; Oskam, 1989; Benjamin et al., 
1999; Bouamra and Réquillart,  2000; Bouamra et al., 2001). EU dairy policy instruments 
involve import quotas, export subsidies, domestic production and consumption subsidies, 
intervention prices, as well as domestic production quotas. The 1995 GATT agreement placed 
constraints on the use of price subsidies, import tariffs and quotas, and export subsidies. Since 
such policy instruments have been historically used to support farm income, this raises interest in 
investigating alternative policies that are WTO-compatible.  
Price discrimination is one tool available to increase income of market participants with 
market power. This can be done by increasing prices on markets with more inelastic demand. 
Such schemes are also available to policy makers. For example, the USA and Canada have 
implemented price discrimination policies in their dairy markets as a means of increasing dairy 
farm income (e.g., Sumner and Wolf, 1996; Cox and Chavas, 2001). This price discrimination 
involves increasing prices for fluid milk and other dairy products with inelastic demand to 
generate additional income that can be redistributed to dairy farmers. Such schemes do not 
necessarily create a price wedge between domestic and world markets; they do not involve direct  
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costs to the taxpayers; and their greatest price distortions occur on domestic markets for non-
traded goods (e.g., fluid milk). As exemplified by the recent Canadian case in WTO, their exists 
a debate to determine if price discrimination policy among domestic markets is  compatible with 
WTO rules.
2 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the prospects for developing a price 
discrimination policy in the EU dairy sector. This raises a number of questions. Can price 
discrimination policy be a substitute for more traditional policy instruments used to support dairy 
farm income? How much income might realistically be redistributed to dairy farmers at the 
expense of consumers? Finally, how efficient would price discrimination be as a means of 
increasing farm income?  
This paper relies on an interregional model of the EU dairy sector, involving milk 
production, dairy processing and consumption of ten dairy commodities in nine regions 
(Bouamra et al., 2001). The model is used to simulate the effects of a price discrimination policy 
under alternative scenarios. We investigate the effects of increasing the price of commodities 
with more inelastic demand (fluid milk and soft dairy products), with the generated income being 
redistributed to dairy farmers. We evaluate the interaction effects between dairy production 
quotas and price discrimination policy.  
                                                 
2 So far, the price discrimination policy implemented by US milk marketing orders has not challenged in Court. 
However, portions of Canada’s Class 5 (Special Products Class) classified pricing scheme were found to violate 
Articles 9.1(a) and 9.3(v) of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture because it induced price wedges between domestic 
and world prices which benefited Canadian exports. This was deemed an export subsidy in violation of Canada’s 
GATT commitments (see Dobson, 1999).  Recent decision of Appeal court challenges some of these arguments.  
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The paper is organized as follows. We first briefly present price discrimination and its 
effects. The, using a spatial equilibrium model of the EU dairy sector we study the economic and 
welfare effects of alternative EU price discrimination policies. Implications of the results for EU 
dairy policy are finally discussed. 
 
2. Price Discrimination in the EU Dairy Sector 
The impact of price discrimination is illustrated in figures 1 and 2. As shown in 
Helmberger (1991), the figures show graphically for a single region the effects of price 
discrimination between two markets: a class I market with a more inelastic demand, and a class 
II market. The benefits of price discrimination are redistributed to producers through a farm 
“blend price.” Figure 1 shows the effects of price discrimination with production quota. In 
contrast, figure 2 represents the market equilibrium conditions in the absence of production 
quota. Without price discrimination, the equilibrium price is P
0 and equilibrium production is  
Q
0.  The discrimination scheme is implemented by increasing the class I price to a high level 
(PI
F) while the class II price is determined by market conditions (PII
F). The producers receive a 
blend price which is the weighted average of class I and class II prices and all producers receive 
this blend price. The processors of class I product have to pay a tax to the collecting/monitoring 
agency which then redistributes the generated revenue to the farmers. Assuming the agency 
makes neither profit nor losses, it means that area ABCD is equal to area DEFG in figures 1-2. 
In figure 1, the price discrimination scheme has no impact on milk production since the 
production quota (Q) is binding. Compared to a no-price discrimination scheme, the producer 
price increases from P0 to Pp
F, generating a higher quota rent and increasing milk revenue. Class 




F) and demand for class II products increases. We refer to these impacts 
as the indirect “spillover” effects of class I price discrimination on the class II markets. This 
generates gains to consumers of class II products at the expense of class I consumers. Because of 
the production quota, the negative impact on welfare is limited if demand for class I products is 
rather inelastic. Moreover, due to the quota, the supply price distortion does not induce an 
increase in production (if quotas are binding in the reference situation); therefore this price 
distortion does not create a deadweight loss. 
Figure 2 represents the no-quota scenario. It shows that, under price discrimination, 
production increases from Q
0 to Q
F in response to an increase in the farm price. The increase in 
producer milk price is lower than in Figure 1 and the revenue generated to farmers is also 
reduced. Also, the increase in class II production and associated decrease in class II price are 
larger than in the presence of production quotas. The supply response tends to generate larger net 
welfare losses. We now present, using a spatial equilibrium model for the EU dairy sector,  a 
quantitative analysis of the economic effects of such a price discrimination scheme in the EU 
dairy sector. 
 
3. Simulation Results and Implications 
The EU dairy sector model represents the production and allocation of milk to ten dairy 
commodities in nine regions. The dairy commodities are: (1) fluid milk, (2) butter, (3) skim milk 
powder, (4) fresh dairy products, (5) whole milk powder, (6) condensed milk, (7) casein, (8) hard 
and semi-hard cheese, (9) processed cheese, and (10) soft cheese, blue cheese and fresh cheese. 
The nine EU production/consumption regions are: (1) France, (2) Germany and Austria, (3) 
Belgium and Luxembourg, (4) Netherlands, (5) Denmark, (6) Spain and Portugal, (7) Italy and  
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Greece, (8) Sweden and Finland, and (9) United Kingdom and Ireland. Each region produces 
milk, consumes dairy products, and trades with other regions. To these regions, we add the rest 
of the world. The inclusion of the rest of the world allows linkages between EU and world dairy 
markets, where the EU is treated as a “large country”.
3 The reader will find a description of the 
model as well as elements on the performance of the model in Bouamra et al 2001, 2002.  
The model represents supply/demand conditions for 2000. In order to determine if price 
discrimination could be a substitute for traditional policy instruments, we define two “base 
scenarios”. They both assume no production or consumption subsidies, no government 
intervention on the butter and nonfat dry milk markets, and no dairy export subsidies.
4 In Base I, 
we assume that milk production quotas are maintained while in Base II they are removed. As 
compared with 2000 EU dairy policy which combines quotas, export subsidies, domestic 
subsidies and intervention prices, the EU milk price would decrease by 24% in Base I and 28% 
in Base II. In base I, due to the quota system, milk production does not change while in base II it 
marginally increases by roughly 1%. Due to drop in milk price, milk producers would loss €7 
billions in base I (as compared to current policy) and more than €8 billions in base II.  
 
As suggested in figures 1 and 2, these two base scenarios (with and without production 
quotas) will allow us to compare the impact of price discrimination policy under alternative 
                                                 
3 In 1999, EU share of world dairy trade was 27 percent for butter, 45 percent for cheese, 26 percent for skim milk 
powder, and 48 percent for whole milk powder. 
4 This policy context involves greater market liberalization than current EU dairy policy. The base scenarios reflect 
situations that may be obtained under further multilateral WTO negotiations.  
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reference situations. We consider a price discrimination scheme where the price wedges are set 
equal to €0.05/kg for fluid milk (or 11.6 percent of the base price), and €0.10/kg for soft dairy 
products (or 5.4 percent of the base price).
5 We assume that the price discrimination scheme is 
implemented at the EU level. It means that the redistribution constraint (the agency makes 
neither benefits nor losses) is imposed at the EU level (this is called a pooling scheme in 
opposition with a non pooling scheme where such a constraint would be imposed in each country 
for example). Thus, two scenarios are presented. In the first one, price discrimination is 
associated with no supply response as milk production quotas are binding. In the second one, we 
investigate possible interactions between price discrimination policy and milk production quotas. 
With milk supply elasticities in the range 1.0 to 1.5, this corresponds to a long run situation 
allowing for large supply response to changes in milk price.   
Impact on markets 
The simulated effects of price discrimination on the EU dairy sector are presented  in 
tables 1 and 2. Table 1 provides the change in milk price and production, the difference in the 
blend price received by farmers and in the milk price for class II products, as well as the impact 
on some dairy products’ markets. In table 2, we report  the welfare effects of price 
discrimination. 
 The impacts of price discrimination on farm prices correspond to (PP
F  - P
0) in figures 1 
and 2. Table 1 indicates that, in the presence of milk production quotas, milk price would 
increase by 6-7 percent on average. Interestingly, the results are quite different in the absence of 
                                                 
5 These wedges were calculated to correspond to the equivalent of a 25 percent tax on the value of the components 
found in fluid milk and soft dairy products.  
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milk production quotas. Here, the impact of price discrimination generates only a 1.4 percent 
increase in EU average milk price. The reason is that, in the longer term, significant milk supply 
response takes place, which reduces price adjustments as well as the ability of producers to 
benefit from price discrimination. This shows how supply response can affect the ability of 
government price policy to redistribute income to producers. These wedges correspond to (PP
F - 
PII
F) in figures 1 and 2. 
When production quotas still exist, milk production adjustments are very limited as 
supply response to farm price changes is prevented. Production adjustments become more 
important in the absence of production quotas. This explains why the impact on milk price is 
lower when there is no constraint on production.  As expected, price discrimination generates 
significant price increases for fluid milk  (and fresh dairy products, not reported in  table 1). The 
indirect induced spillover effects reduce prices for class II dairy products. For example, skim 
milk powder (SMP) prices are found to decrease by 1.2% in the presence of production quotas  
and 4.2 percent in the absence of production quotas. These induced price effects give the EU 
some additional advantage on world markets. For example, SMP exports would increase by 11 
percent under scenario 1, and 32 percent under scenario 2. In response world market prices will 
be negatively affected because EU is a large exporter. This shows that domestic price 
discrimination on fluid milk and fresh dairy products would put some downward pressure on the 
price of traded dairy products and that such induced price distortions would help the EU export 
on world dairy markets. Such effects are smaller in the presence of production quotas, but would 
increase as supply response becomes more important. This illustrates that, while EU dairy price 
discrimination would affect the EU dairy sector directly, it would also have some induced effects 
on export incentives and world prices. It remains to be seen whether these indirect spillover  
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effects on world markets would raise questions concerning the legality and/or desirability of such 
price discrimination schemes in future WTO negotiations. 
Impact on welfare 
Table 2 evaluates the welfare effects of price discrimination, as measured by changes in 
producer surplus and consumer surplus. Class I consumers would be made worse off by price 
discrimination, as the price they pay for class I products rises. In contrast, consumers of class II 
products would enjoy an implicit consumption subsidy generated by the lower class II prices. 
However, the losses to class I consumers dominate and aggregate consumer welfare falls. The 
higher class I prices generate revenues that are redistributed to farmers. In the presence of 
production quotas, EU producer surplus would increase by €1.5-1.7 billions.6 This indicates that 
price discrimination schemes can generate significant income transfers from consumers to 
farmers without involving taxpayers (except for administrative costs). These welfare gains can 
be compared to the estimated €7-9 billions loss in producer surplus generated by extensive 
market liberalization (as reported above; see Bouamra et al. 2001). It suggests that price 
discrimination would not suffice to compensate EU dairy farmers for the lower milk price they 
would face under liberalization of EU dairy markets. As such, price discrimination policy may be 
an imperfect substitute for more traditional policy instruments supporting farm income. 
When production quotas are removed, we show that significant supply response greatly 
reduces the ability of price discrimination to enhance farm income. In the absence of quotas, 
                                                 
6 Alternative scheme of price discrimination could be implemented. For example, without pooling across countries, 
the impact on producers’ surplus at the EU level  would not change while the impact on producers’ surplus at the 
regional level would change depending of the importance in the area of the production of classI products.   
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supply response reduces the increase in EU producer surplus to only €320 millions. This 
illustrates the strong interaction effects between production quotas and price discrimination. It 
suggests that, while price discrimination can help increase dairy farm income in the short run, its 
ability to support farm income may deteriorate significantly in the longer term in the absence of 
production quotas.  Table 2 also indicates that consumer surplus decreases more than producer 
surplus increases, implying that price discrimination would generate a decline in total EU 
welfare. However, the net welfare loss is found to be small when production quotas are in place 
(€22 millions) while in the absence of production quotas, the net EU welfare loss is larger (€162 
millions). 
Under production quotas, Table 2 shows that price discrimination is a relatively efficient 
way of redistributing income to producers. Excluding administrative costs of implementing a 
price discrimination scheme, the net welfare loss of transferring €1 to EU dairy producers ranges 
from €0.012 and €0.038. Snow and Warren (1996) estimated that the welfare cost of 1 unit of 
public funds is in the range -0.09 to 0.25. This suggests that the welfare cost of price 
discrimination policy could be as low as, or lower than fully decoupled payments when the 
opportunity cost of public funds is taken into consideration. Conversely, when production 
expands, price discrimination becomes a less efficient income redistribution tool. The net welfare 
cost of transferring €1 to producers then rises to €0.50, which would be greater then the cost 
associated with a direct payment. This shows that milk production quotas improve the efficiency 
of transferring income to farmers through price discrimination. 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has explored the economic and welfare implications of implementing a price 
discrimination policy among EU dairy markets. One of the motivations is to examine whether  
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price discrimination could help support farm income. This may be particularly relevant for future 
WTO negotiations that may stimulate further market liberalization, leading to significant 
reductions in farm prices. As long as price discrimination does not involve an administered and 
targeted price differential between domestic and world markets, it may be seen to be WTO-
compatible. As such, price discrimination policy could possibly serve as a partial substitute for 
more traditional policy instruments under multilateral market liberalization. 
In a market equilibrium context, we present results of a model simulating the effects of price 
discrimination policy in the EU dairy sector. We show that, by increasing prices in markets with 
more inelastic demand, such a policy generates income that can be redistributed to dairy farmers. 
We develop scenarios generating up to a €1.7 billions increase in EU producer surplus. However, 
such results are obtained in the absence of milk supply response (under binding milk production 
quotas). In the presence of significant supply response, the increase in EU producer surplus is 
reduced to €320 million. This suggests that the magnitude of supply response greatly affect the 
ability of price discrimination to transfer income to farmers. Marketing quotas could be one way 
to limit the increase in production: even with relatively high supply elasticity, they would allow 
farmers to maintain the benefits of price discrimination. We show that, due to “large country” 
effects, EU price discrimination would affect world prices. We find that it could reduce the 
world price of skim milk powder by 1-4 percent. In addition, our analysis indicates that the net 
welfare loss to society is smaller in the absence of supply response (e.g. with production quotas), 
but that the efficiency of the transfers declines significantly with supply response. 
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 Table 1: Changes in milk and dairy products markets induced by  price discrimination  
  Production Quota  No Production Quota 
Farm milk price  7.3%  1.4% 
Milk production  0.2%  1.7% 
Milk price differential  9.6%  10.0% 
Fluid milk price  10.2%  8.2% 
Fluid milk consumption  -1.1%  -0.8% 
SMP price   -1.2%  -4.2% 
SMP production   2.2%  7.3% 
SMP exports  11.5%  31.6% 
SMP world price  -1.1%  -4.0% 
Hard ½ hard cheese price   -0.8%  -3.4% 
Hard ½ hard cheese production   0.5%  2.1% 
Hard ½ hard cheese exports  1.9%  7.2% 
Hard ½ hard cheese world price  -0.8%  -3.3% 
 
Table 2 : Impact on surplus and welfare of a price discrimination scheme 
  
  Production Quotas  No production Quotas 
Producers 1778  321 
Consumers -1821  -652 
Total EU welfare  -22  -162 
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